Bargaining : formal theories of negotiation / edited and with contributions by Oran R. Young.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 409-412) and index.

Strategic interaction and bargaining / Oran R. Young -- Part 1. Game-theoretic models of bargaining. Theory of the reluctant duelist / Daniel Ellsberg -- The bargaining problem / John F. Nash -- Two-person cooperative games / John F. Nash -- Bargaining and conflict situations in the light of a new approach to game theory / John C. Harsanyi -- Game-theoretic analyses of bargaining / Robert L. Bishop -- Part 2. Economic models of bargaining. Economic warfare / Frederik Zeuthen -- A general theory of bargaining / Jan Pen -- A Zeuthen-Hicks theory of bargaining / Robert L. Bishop -- A theory of the bargaining process / John G. Cross. Comment / Alan Coddington. Reply / John G. Cross -- The resolution of conflict / M.B. Nicholson -- Part 3. Prospects for a unified theory. Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory of games / John C. Harsanyi -- Comment on the bargaining problem / Jan Pen -- A unified treatment of bargaining theory / Harvey M. Wagner -- The bargaining problem. Notes / John C. Harsanyi. Rejoinder / Harvey M. Wagner -- Part 4. Manipulative models of bargaining. An essay on bargaining / Thomas C. Schelling -- The theory and practice of blackmail / Daniel Ellsberg -- The bargainer's calculus / Oran R. Young -- Conclusion. The analysis of bargaining : problems and prospects / Oran R. Young.

"In a volume which covers forty years of work on bargaining and negotiation and includes twenty-two contributions by the most prominent authors in the field--such as Frederik Zeuthen's theories of the early 1930s and Daniel Ellsberg's theory of the 'Relucant Dualist'--Oran Young evaluates all of the most important deductive models in the field, demonstrating their relevance for a wide range of political, social, and economic contexts, and emphasizing their ultimate application to real-world situations. Concerned with the potential of bargaining models as 'descriptive' or 'positive' theory in contrast to 'prescriptive' theory, Young views all of the theories as analytic techniques for coping with the problems associated with strategic interaction. He provides analytic and interpretative introductions to each of the book's four parts: game-theoretic models of bargaining, economic models of bargaining, prospects for a unified theory, and manipulative models of bargaining. He also furnishes a general introduction and conclusion. Bargaining is common in a great many sociopolitical relationships, from the interactions of the members of family units to the interactions of nation states. Because of this widespread occurrence, there is a need for theoretical work on bargaining by students of all of the social sciences. In collecting and presenting the most important writings in the field, evaluating the prospects for further theoretical work, and clarifying several conceptual problems which commonly arise in analyses of bargaining, Young's book attempts to encourage this needed research. No advanced knowledge of mathematics is required to understand the essays, though a general familiarity with some of the principal techniques utilized in game theoretic and economic models is useful"--Publisher's description, p. [2] of dust jacket.

NLJCols20082021